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Few Defence topics have been as prominent or invested with as much optimism in recent years as 
defence diplomacy (also called military diplomacy or defence engagement). In response to the growing 
security challenges of Asia, scholars, policymakers and practitioners have looked for ways to build 
confidence, decrease the risk and impact of accidents and encourage peaceful dispute resolution. 
Defence diplomacy, namely the practice of military and defence officials engaging their overseas 
counterparts, is increasingly regarded as a vital way to achieve these aims.
Given the importance of this topic, a special Centre of Gravity paper has been created to explore the 
issue and help guide policymakers. This edition features six short papers, each with a different take and 
policy recommendation. The authors were asked the same question ‘Is the game worth the candle?’ 
and while their answers focus largely on Australia there are lessons and implications from their findings 
for the entire region.
Brendan Taylor, the head of the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre begins the special edition calling for 
a stocktake of current efforts, in a bid to understand what has worked and what resources it requires. 
He is joined by two colleagues, John Blaxland who argues strongly in favour of an expanded defence 
diplomacy program and Hugh White who urges caution about the strategic influence of the practice. 
To complement these views, Nick Bisley, Executive Director La Trobe Asia, highlights the need for 
realistic ambitions. Lieutenant General (Ret.) Peter Leahy draws on his distinguished career in the ADF 
to detail how defence diplomacy occurs in practice and why it matters. Finally, See Seng Tan, Deputy 
Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore provides a regional perspective 
on Australia’s defence diplomacy. The authors of these papers don’t agree with each other, and that 
was precisely why they were invited to contribute. But some common themes are clear. Such as the 
need for a clear —and public — strategy along with integrating defence diplomacy into the efforts of 
other parts of government.
Together these six papers provide insight into the practice and potential of defence diplomacy. This 
special edition also marks a re-launch of the Centre of Gravity Series. While some of the design may 
change, the focus remains the same: inviting some of the best analysts from Australia and around the 
world to provide short, accessible papers on the key questions facing Australian strategic affairs.
Andrew Carr 
Editor, Centre of Gravity Series 
Strategic & Defence Studies Centre 
Australian National University
Defence Diplomacy:  
Is the game worth the candle?
Editor’s Foreword
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Once seen as lying towards the softer end of the spectrum of strategic activity in the Asia-Pacific, 
defence diplomacy has been taking on a much harder edge in recent years. The region’s great powers 
are increasingly using a range of defence diplomatic techniques to advance their strategic agendas.
Speaking at the May 2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), 
Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a more Asia-centric approach to security and a redrawing of the 
region’s multilateral architecture along such lines.1 Consistent with this, Beijing is currently developing its 
own version of one of Asia’s leading forums for defence diplomacy, the Shangri-La Dialogue.2
Not to be outdone, Tokyo has been loosening longstanding restrictions on the provision of military 
equipment to other countries – another form of defence diplomacy – to support its assembly of a 
counterbalancing coalition in the face of China’s rise.3 The United States too is employing defence 
diplomacy to buttress its own Asian rebalancing strategy, as epitomised by the rotation of marines 
through facilities in the north of Australia and the training they undertake with regional friends and 
partners during the course of their rotation.4
Australian interest in defence diplomacy as a means for furthering strategic objectives in the region 
goes back much further than these recent developments. During the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, 
Canberra provided considerable defence aid to a number of countries in Southeast Asia and the 
Southwest Pacific.5
Yet despite this longstanding tradition, it is far from clear that 
Australian defence diplomacy has always been sufficiently 
strategic. Writing in the mid-1990s during the last significant 
burst of Australian enthusiasm for defence diplomacy, 
Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr characterised these efforts 
as ‘presumptive.’ They argued that Canberra lacked a clear 
and coherent strategy to guide them. And they called upon 
the government to undertake a stocktake of Australia’s 
defence diplomacy with a view to addressing these problems 
and to ensure that such efforts were constructive in 
the future.6
It seems prudent today to reflect upon the advice proffered 
by Ball and Kerr, particularly at a time when defence 
diplomacy is clearly coming back into fashion. The Australian 
Department of Defence might usefully consider undertaking 
a stocktake of the kind they suggest.
Australia’s defence diplomacy:  
Time for a stocktake
Brendan Taylor
Executive Summary
 > Defence diplomacy has become increasingly popular in recent years, especially 
amongst the great powers of the Asia-Pacific.
 > Australia has a long and important history conducting defence diplomacy, but 
an assessment is needed of the effectiveness and value for money from some 
of these efforts.
 > Ultimately a stocktake would be the first step to developing a clear strategy for 
Australian defence diplomacy and its place in national strategic policy.
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Such a stocktake could begin by looking at what aspects 
of defence diplomacy are best serving Australia’s interests. 
One positive example here might be Canberra’s commitment 
to the Shangri-La Dialogue. The benefits that Canberra 
derives from its prominent participation in this gathering 
seem relatively clear cut. The Dialogue certainly serves as 
an exercise in efficiency for Australian defence officials and 
military practitioners. At the 2011 Shangri-la Dialogue, for 
instance, the Australian Defence Minister met bilaterally with 
counterparts from 14 other countries.7 The Dialogue also 
provides an additional opportunity for Canberra to coordinate 
with its allies and to signal common positions. Australia 
participated in trilateral Defence Ministerial talks with the US 
and Japan on the sidelines of the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue 
and issued a joint statement expressing their opposition to 
the use of coercion or force to alter the status quo in the East 
and South China Seas.
At the same time, a stocktake of Australia’s defence diplomacy could also illuminate enduring practices 
that are perhaps no longer delivering as well as they could. One area that might warrant closer 
attention, is the Defence Cooperation Scholarship Program. Under this scheme, funding is provided to 
support approximately 70 foreign officers while they study in Australia. These scholarships have been 
taken up across a range of universities where recipients have chosen to study an even broader array 
of subjects – including Engineering, International Relations, Human Rights Law and Policy, Strategic 
Studies, Education and Information Technology.8
Is this highly disaggregated, demand-driven approach 
optimal or might Australian strategic objectives be better 
realised through a more coherent, focused program where 
scholarship recipients undertake their studies as a single 
cohort, attending the same institution and as part of a 
specialised, elite program?
Beyond an assessment of what is and what is not currently 
working, a stocktake of Australia’s defence diplomacy 
could also identify potential gaps in Asia’s evolving security 
architecture that Canberra might productively fill.
The relatively new ASEAN Defence Minister’s Plus (ADMM+) 
could be a particularly opportune target of opportunity. In 
particular, it does not yet have a dedicated Track 2 process 
through which new, fresh thinking from the non-official sector 
– academics, think tankers, journalists and the like – can be 
fed up to the official level in a structured way. Many if not 
most of Asia’s other leading multilateral processes have such 
arrangements in place.
Care would of course need to be taken to avoid any arousing 
of regional sensitivities here, particularly given the reticence 
towards Australia that was created not all that long ago as a result of the Rudd government’s ill-fated 
Asia-Pacific community initiative of 2008.
That said, provided the idea for a new second track grouping was taken forward in close collaboration 
with other like-minded partners, particularly from Southeast Asia, this is a gap that Canberra might 
usefully seek to fill. The history of Australian participation in the formation of the Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) during the 1990s – a grouping which became the official Track 
2 analogue for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – provides a useful precedent.9
The above list of suggestions is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. While it is often 
claimed that the benefits of defence diplomacy are largely intangible and thus difficult to quantify, the 
above analysis demonstrates that it is possible to make judgments about which aspects of Australia’s 
defence diplomacy are serving Canberra well, which are not optimal and what more might be done.
A stocktake of 
Australia’s Defence 
diplomacy could 
also illuminate 
enduring practices 
that are perhaps no 
longer delivering as 
well as they could.
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The advantage of undertaking a thorough stocktake of Australia’s defence diplomacy along these lines 
is that such an assessment can then also provide the basis for a more coherent strategy of the kind that 
Ball and Kerr charged was missing during the 1990s.
Brendan Taylor is the head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University.
Policy Recommendation
Australia should conduct a thorough stocktake of its defence diplomacy. A public 
document with the findings should be published as a way to build domestic and 
regional support for further defence diplomacy initiatives.
Endnotes
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If diplomacy is ‘the profession, activity, or skill of managing international relations, typically by a 
country’s representatives abroad’, then what does defence diplomacy look like? Perhaps the best way 
to think about it is to consider specific examples.
Australia’s relationship with Thailand, for example, has been of considerable value particularly to 
Australia’s ability to make a significant and useful contribution to regional security. Australia established 
diplomatic relations with Thailand in 1952 and was a founding member of the now-defunct South East 
Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), headquartered in Bangkok from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. 
Thereafter, as an investment in the relationship, Australia participated routinely in a range of bilateral 
military exercises designed to foster mutual understanding and greater interoperability for a range of 
contingencies. Such air, land, maritime and special forces exercises provided opportunities to maintain 
channels of communication as well as handy benchmarking of each other’s capabilities in case of need. 
Critics may argue that this has been a waste of time and money, making little difference in Thailand’s 
political or domestic behaviour. 
Yet it was not accidental that Australia’s investment in the relationship resulted in Thailand being the first 
ASEAN country to agree to support Australia’s efforts in East Timor. Bangkok supported Canberra in its 
hour of need during the dark days of early September 1999. Only after Thailand had committed forces 
and a deputy force commander, General Songkitti Jaggabatara, did other ASEAN countries agree to 
participate. Indeed, the Royal Thai Army infantry battalion 
that exercised alongside an Australian infantry company in 
Thailand in July 1999, as part of Exercise Chapel Gold, was 
the same battalion that joined the mission in East Timor a 
few months later. Such exercises were beneficial for honing 
the tactical proficiency and regional cultural awareness of 
Australian forces. They also enhanced Australia’s ability to 
harness regional partners in support of Australian regional 
security and stability initiatives.
Had it not been for the decades of defence investment in the 
bilateral relationship through exchanges, scholarships and 
exercises, Thailand would have been far more reluctant to 
commit forces to East Timor. In fact more than likely Australia 
would have been left friendless in its region. Similarly, 
Australia’s longstanding engagement with the Philippines 
proved its value when that country also contributed forces 
in 1999.
Defending defence diplomacy
John Blaxland 
Executive summary
 > Decades of investment in defence diplomacy resulted in Thailand being the first 
ASEAN country to support the Australian-led UN-mandated 1999 intervention 
in East Timor.
 > Australian alumni like PNG CDF Brigadier Gilbert Toropo exemplify the utility in 
investing in defence diplomacy through scholarships, exchanges and exercises.
 > Military engagement on carefully selected assistance and development projects 
could generate considerable goodwill between the respective forces, while 
bolstering mutual. understanding, security and stability
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In the South Pacific, other than New Zealand (with its intimate ties and high levels of interoperability with 
Australian counterparts), Australia’s relationship with Papua New Guinea (PNG) is the most significant. 
Regular exchanges, shared training and exercises and a range of common interests continue to foster 
the bilateral relationship with the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF). Although the PNGDF’s effectiveness 
and political reliability has been questioned, the strength of the bilateral relationship has proven 
particularly useful as a restraining influence on the PNGDF 
and for facilitating its participation in a number of Pacific-
oriented operations notably in Solomon Islands and beyond. 
This has been defence diplomacy at its best. The new 
Commander of the PNGDF, Brigadier Gilbert Toropo, for 
instance, trained in Australia and served as an instructor at 
Duntroon in the mid-1990s. He is a man who is held in high 
regard by those who know him. He is the quintessential 
example of the utility of investing in defence diplomacy 
through scholarships, exchanges and exercises.
That’s all well and good, critics may say, but that was then 
and circumstances have changed. With the prominence of 
great power rivalry such efforts may come to be seen as 
trifling and marginal. I beg to differ. 
The two large and new amphibious Landing Helicopter Dock ships (LHDs) coming into service are 
set to provide some of the most useful platforms for operating in and around Australia’s vast coastline 
and beyond. When at full operating capability, and working alongside complementary ADF elements, 
they will be versatile platforms for force projection. But short of such dire contingencies, there are 
creative ways they may be employed to bolster regional security and stability through some creative 
defence diplomacy. 
First of all, the use of the LHDs should be tied in closely with 
Australia’s regional engagement and aid priorities–its flagship 
defence diplomacy activities. A reflection on US Navy 
and US Marine Corps experience is instructive. US Navy 
LHDs routinely conduct focused humanitarian assistance 
missions in places like Timor-Leste and Indonesia, earning 
immense goodwill while materially assisting the needy with 
construction, medical, dental and other support to local 
communities. These operations also happen to test a wide 
spectrum of military skills considered essential for complex 
warfighting, but which equally are valuable for humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief.
Australia’s experience with the acquisition of the C-17 aircraft 
is also instructive. Four C-17s were initially purchased for 
the RAAF and within weeks they were being used to deliver 
support after Cyclone Nargis in Burma in May 2008. They 
have also contributed significantly to the resupply of troops in Afghanistan. This demonstrated that 
by acquiring a new capability, the ADF could undertake relief tasks that simply could not have been 
contemplated previously. Similarly, with the imminent arrival of the LHDs many good reasons will 
emerge for having acquired them. 
One such reason is that the ADF will be able to focus on projects mutually agreed with regional 
countries including Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and a range of South Pacific Island 
states. Engagement on strategically chosen development assistance projects could generate 
considerable goodwill while bolstering security and stability. With the prospect of increased instability 
and environmental challenges, short notice calls for such assistance are more than likely.
From now on, when considering response options in the face of a deteriorating security situation in 
Australia’s region, a significantly more flexible and adaptable capability will be available. Conversely, the 
very existence of Australia’s robust amphibious capability will act as a distinct deterrent, particularly in 
the South Pacific, in the knowledge that extreme action can be counteracted by a significant Australian 
force that could arrive at short notice. Defence diplomacy at its best.
A more useful and 
noble role for the 
ADF would be hard 
to find
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In the meantime, as Australia looks to engage more closely with Indonesia and other ASEAN and South 
Pacific neighbours, their engineers, medical and logistic teams should be invited on-board the LHDs 
and alongside the Australian teams to deploy and carry out agreed-upon constructive tasks. This may 
well prove ground-breaking, literally and metaphorically. Such a capability is particularly significant 
when weighing up the security and stability calculus. On balance therefore, defence diplomacy can be 
expected to feature prominently in future ADF activities. In uncertain times such as these, a more useful 
and noble role for the ADF would be hard to find.
Dr John Blaxland is a Senior Fellow at SDSC. His latest book is The Australian Army from Whitlam 
to Howard.
Policy recommendation
Investment in bilateral regional relationships through scholarships, exchanges 
and exercises can generate a surprising array of short and long-term dividends 
in personal relationships and in a willingness to collaborate on challenging 
operational tasks. Bilateral and multi-lateral military engagement on development 
assistance projects utilising the new amphibious ships should be encouraged, 
particularly with Indonesia, as well as PNG, Timor-Leste and beyond. The effect 
in terms of enhanced goodwill and mutual understanding could be literally and 
metaphorically ground-breaking. 
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People expect big things of defence diplomacy. There is something intuitively attractive about the 
idea that many of our international problems—especially those involving security issues—can best be 
handled though interaction between military people and by contact between armed forces, rather than 
through negotiation between diplomats, political leaders or others.
It is important to distinguish this kind of defence diplomacy from what we might call ‘strategic’ or 
‘security’ diplomacy. Strategic or security diplomacy covers the whole range of diplomatic efforts 
designed to promote or protect our strategic or security interests, and as such might be undertaken in 
any number of ways. As a category it relates to questions of ends, not means. The category of defence 
diplomacy on the other hand relates to the means used, rather than the ends pursued – though in 
fact most defence diplomacy is directed at strategic or 
security ends, what makes it defence diplomacy is that it is 
conducted via military channels.
Why should this idea be so intuitively attractive to so 
many people? I think there are several reasons. Militaries 
themselves are naturally happy to claim a major role in 
keeping Australia safe when there is no fighting to be done. 
And for the public at large the idea of military diplomacy 
offers a reassuring model of how armed forces can protect 
us without actually going to war. Most voters love their armed 
forces but don’t much like the idea of fighting, and find it hard 
to imagine that any serious conflict could ever break out. So 
it offers a palatable and plausible explanation of what their 
armed forces actually do to keep them secure when there is 
no war on.
Defence diplomacy appeals to politicians and policymakers 
for the same reasons, and also because it offers a good 
story to tell about how they are managing strategic problems 
which in reality they find baffling. For example Australian 
leaders have enthusiastically proposed that strategic 
tensions arising from Australia’s relationships with China 
and America can be ameliorated by increasing contact and 
dialogue between Australian and Chinese armed forces.
But behind all these positive attitudes lies a largely 
unexamined assumption that defence diplomacy works 
better than other forms of diplomacy to soothe strategic 
tensions, ease rivalries and facilitate cooperation on 
security issues. 
Grand expectations, little promise
Hugh White
Executive summary
 > Defence diplomacy often seems like a great way to soothe strategic tensions 
and allay mistrust.
 > Sometimes this can work, for example when personal connections between 
Australian and Indonesian officers helped avoid problems in East Timor.
 > But military to military contacts do little if anything to manage deeper strategic 
risks, and may induce a false complacency that problems are being managed. 
History shows that inter-service bonhomie is no bar to conflict
We should treat with 
great caution the 
idea that friendly 
contact between 
services make 
any significant 
difference to 
the underlying 
essentials 
of strategic 
relationships 
between countries
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This assumption is certainly true in some circumstances, at least to the extent that defence-to-defence 
contacts can, in some specific situations, achieve results that cannot be achieved in other ways. For 
example, personal relationships built up over many years between officers directly involved on the 
ground on both sides made a huge difference to managing the risk of a clash between TNI and ADF 
forces on East Timor in 1999. Likewise direct service-to-service contact is essential for fostering 
practical operational cooperation in areas like maritime surveillance and disaster relief. 
These examples and many others suggest a pattern: defence diplomacy works at the operational and 
tactical levels. It is much harder to establish that it works at the strategic level, but this is the level at 
which it is often thought to be most effective and most important.
Much of the enthusiasm for defence diplomacy is based 
on the idea that plain-speaking military men, talking soldier 
to soldier, can resolve differences and build trust and 
understanding where civilian diplomats and politicians 
become mired in half-truths, evasions and circumlocutions. 
This idea is buttressed by others: that military men from 
different countries have more in common with one another 
than civilian diplomats and politicians, that they find it easier 
to see the other side’s point and view, and are less prone 
to get bogged down in what is dismissively called ‘politics’. 
And underlying all this is the agreeable belief that any 
strategic differences that arise between countries result from 
misunderstandings which only need to be cleared up by 
soldierly plain-speaking for the problems to go away.
None of these are true. They are myths and 
misunderstandings that have arisen over the recent decades 
in which Australian diplomacy has not had to deal with many, 
if any, really serious strategic problems. It has been easy to forget that such problems do not arise from 
simple misunderstandings but from deeper differences in strategy and objectives. Those differences 
cannot be swept away by plain talk: they are only reconciled, if at all, by negotiation and compromise. 
There is no reason why military men should not play a role in such negotiations, but equally there is no 
reason to believe that they are any more suited to them than civilian diplomats.
Above all, we should treat with great caution the idea that friendly contact between services – ship 
visits, senior officer tours, search and rescue exercises – make any significant difference to the underlying 
essentials of strategic relationships between countries. We should be equally careful of the idea that this 
kind of defence diplomacy is an effective and sufficient way to manage the implications for Australia’s security 
of the increasing strategic rivalries in Asia today. Defence diplomacy with China will do nothing to address 
the immense implications for Australia of escalating strategic rivalry between the US, China and Japan.
History tells us that when a real crisis strikes, goodwill between services is soon forgotten. On 30 June 
1914, the Royal Navy’s Second Battle Squadron steamed out of the German naval base at Kiel after 
a festive goodwill visit which was cut short by the sad news of the assassination of Archduke Franz-
Ferdinand of Austria. 
As they left the squadron’s commander, Vice Admiral Sir George Warrender sent his German hosts 
a famously unprophetic message: ‘Friends in the past, friends forever’. Within a month he led his 
Squadron to its war station at Scapa Flow. So much for defence diplomacy.
Hugh White is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University.
Policy recommendation
The key to effective defence diplomacy is to be realistic about what it can achieve. 
Long-cultivated relationships between officers of different countries can pay 
real operational dividends in a crisis, but fleeting senior officer visits, port calls 
and highly-scripted combined exercises do little is anything to help address the 
dynamics of national strategic relationships, and we should not imagine otherwise.
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The past twenty years has seen a remarkable growth in security focused multilateralism in Asia. Until 
1994, there were no multilateral efforts to address the region’s many security challenges. The creation 
of the ASEAN Regional Forum sparked a proliferation of bodies and mechanisms each with its own 
acronym and purported work program. This has been driven by the sense that the strategic setting is 
in a period of transition, the widening out of the range and form of threats caused by globalization’s 
cross-cutting networks and the perception that the 
spectrum of threat has been widened to now include 
non-traditional sources, such as transnational criminal 
networks or infectious disease. What is driving demand for 
greater cooperation is reasonably clear. On the supply side, 
experience in Asia has been decidedly mixed.
In many cases soon after establishing a new institution 
or forum, members show little interest in moving beyond 
platitudes of comprehensive security and a shared future. 
But not all recent activity suffers such builders’ remorse. 
Cooperative efforts that are narrowly focused on defence 
and security concerns enthuse participants and are seen by 
Asia’s states as having considerable promise. The diplomacy 
of defence is perceived to be much more effective, at least 
judging by energy, investment and innovation, than more 
expansive forms of security cooperation in the region. 
Defence diplomacy, understood as a specific subset of broader forms of Asian security cooperation, is 
a remarkably dynamic creature. Some of the more notable examples include the IISS-run Shangri-La 
Dialogue, the ADMM+, the RIMPAC exercise and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. If one includes 
more mini-lateral efforts and bilateral military-military links there appears to be an almost limitless range 
of defence diplomacy in the region. 
Asia’s states are investing in this endeavour and many are making it a key part of their longer range 
strategic policy. But is this enthusiasm well placed? Are they right to think defence diplomacy can 
deliver better results than the rather underwhelming experiences in Asian security cooperation of the 
past fifteen years?
Curiously, one of the appeals of defence diplomacy is that it provides a less controversial means to 
work collaboratively on security issues than traditional diplomatic methods. HADR activity is the usual 
point of departure here. It is difficult to argue against the benefit of doing more on this front and the 
logic of such work providing stepping stones to wider and deeper forms of cooperation is self-evident. 
Beyond operational interactions having broader security spinoffs, there are three other main benefits 
The Possibilities and Limits of Defence Diplomacy 
in Asia
Nick Bisley
Executive summary
 > Many Asian states perceive defence diplomacy to be the most useful and 
effective form of the recent wave of security multilateralism in the region.
 > Defence diplomacy is thought to have the potential to manage tensions, 
improve information flows and build trust and a sense of common cause in Asia.
 > Defence diplomacy’s inherent political qualities define the limits of its potential. 
It has no distinctive attribute that will allow it to overcome Asia’s deep seated 
political cleavages.
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that defence diplomacy has the potential to deliver. First, it can reduce tensions and help manage 
crises. Having defence personnel, both uniform and civilian, working in non-coercive ways traditionally 
associated with diplomats provides the opportunity to take the heat out of points of friction and to keep 
crises from escalating. 
It has long been thought that bad strategic decisions 
derive from poor information and misperceptions. Defence 
diplomacy’s second benefit is that it can improve information 
flows and enhance the mutual understanding of states’ 
capabilities, interests and where their ‘redlines’ actually lie. 
It is often argued that Iraq invaded Kuwait because Saddam 
Hussein believed that the US had implicitly said it would not 
respond. By getting those defence personnel most directly 
associated with these issues together, so the argument 
goes, they can be in a position to make better decisions on 
questions of security and strategy. Third, defence diplomacy 
can improve the strategic environment by building high-level 
trust and a sense of common cause through regular dialogue 
and the development of personal links among senior defence 
officials. With all this on offer, it is hardly surprising that 
defence diplomacy is seen as having a particular appeal in 
Asia’s current strategic environment.
Two of the most significant developments in Australian foreign and defence policy have been 
the development of much closer relations with both Japan and the US. While built on long term 
relationships, the real impetus for this tightening came from operational interactions. The current links 
with Japan, involving a wide range of security related agreements and activities, would not have been 
possible without the connections developed through collaborative work in post-invasion Iraq and the 
2004 Boxing Day Tsunami. Equally, the development of the never-better strategic relationship with 
the US rests heavily on the extensive links forged during the deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. For 
Australia, defence interaction at the operational level has plainly translated into broader strategic policy. 
And it is tempting to think this can be replicated in other circumstances. But it must be emphasised that 
this was work among allies and friends who share interests and values and amongst whom there have 
been no meaningful strategic differences. 
If one looks outside that narrow context, the experience of using defence diplomacy is rather more 
mixed. In particular we have seen clear difficulties linking the small steps of military to military links 
aggregating out to larger gains. Equally, ambitious larger scale efforts have struggled to shape the 
strategic order. Indeed perhaps the largest and most influential example of defence diplomacy, the 
Shangri La Dialogue, illustrates the inability of these mechanisms to overcome the underlying problems 
that beset broader forms of Asian security cooperation. 
The Dialogue, now in its thirteenth year, has become a 
regular feature for set-piece communication on strategic 
policy. At its sidelines it also allows regional defence officials 
to meet in a controlled environment. It has undoubtedly 
improved communication among the Asia’s defence 
ministers and officials but it has not tangibly improved the 
underlying sense of common cause in the region. Indeed 
at the 2014 meeting it became a venue for what some have 
described as strategic grandstanding as the Japanese 
PM, Defence Minister as well as the US Defense Secretary 
explicitly and very publically increased rhetorical pressure 
on China. Rather than being a forum to exchange views 
and improve relations it reflected and indeed magnified 
the underlying cleavages between a rising China that feels 
its potential and rights are being constrained by the US 
and its allies and a US-led regional order that seems in 
no way disposed to make any meaningful adjustments to 
existing arrangements.
We have seen clear 
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Shangri-La represents only the tip of the defence diplomacy iceberg, other more low-key and low-profile 
examples do lack the media glare and grandstanding that goes with this. But it illustrates the bigger 
challenge facing defence diplomacy and one that is often not recognized. Defence diplomacy is popular 
in Asia because it is focused on concrete concerns and values the practical and the technical over the 
abstract and political. Yet all who think about defence diplomacy must recognize that while it may be 
technical in means it is inherently political in its ends. It is about using defence personnel and assets 
to communicate, negotiate and more generally manage relations between states. This means that its 
potential to contribute to Asia’s changing strategic setting is contingent on the participants’ capacity to 
adjust their positions, compromise, and more generally find mutually acceptable agreements about their 
many differences. In many of the more complex issues in the region, Asian states show little interest in 
taking these steps. There is no silver bullet that defence personal and operational activity can bring to 
overcome these political constraints.
When trying to determine the role of defence diplomacy in one’s broader strategic policy recognition 
must be paid to the underlying limitations it faces when trying to grapple with the large scale strategic 
forces. It is most useful when defence expertise is applied to build political capital at the lower level that 
can be used to develop specific bilateral relationships as part of a broader strategic effort.
Defence diplomacy is an important part of the regional setting; we should be ambitious for it and 
creative in the way we use it as part of a broader strategic canvass. However, ambition and innovation 
should be tempered by a recognition of the limits its political qualities impose in a region in which 
strategic cleavages are deep and longstanding. 
Nick Bisley is Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and Professor of International Relations at La Trobe 
University. He can be reached at: n.bisley@latrobe.edu.au or via twitter @NickBisley.
Policy recommendation
Australian defence diplomacy programs need to have realistic ambitions. Its 
promise is greatest in practical activities providing foundations for improving 
specific bilateral relationships that are part of a larger strategic picture. Grandiose 
plans to foster a new regional order or improve regional trust will fail in the same 
way that other such efforts have. 
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Military diplomacy
Peter Leahy
Executive summary
 > In an increasingly complex global security environment military diplomacy adds 
a new and very useful dimension to traditional diplomacy.
 > Military diplomacy requires an investment in relationships and takes time 
to develop.
 > The success of military diplomacy provides the lead to new types of diplomacy 
from the Australian Federal Police and eventually the Australian Border Force.
Introduction
In international affairs, diplomacy has been the primary means by which countries have advanced their 
national interests. When diplomacy failed, those interests were most often pursued through the use 
of military power. In national security terms diplomacy is often referred to as soft power while military 
power is referred to as hard power. Today the distinction is not that clear cut. Military diplomacy is 
proving to be an extremely useful means of pursuing national interests short of conflict.
Some might view the concept of military diplomacy as something of an oxymoron, somewhat akin to 
military intelligence, but in an increasingly complex global security environment it is proving its worth. So 
much so that recently the Minister for Defence, David Johnston, declared himself to be very strong on 
military diplomacy.
The Minster for Defence’s recent enthusiasm for military diplomacy is no doubt linked to two recent 
examples demonstrating the clear benefits to be accrued. Chinese involvement in the international 
search for the missing Malaysian Airlines flight MH370, off Perth, was generous and well received. It also 
opened an opportunity for further cooperation and dialogue 
between the two countries. An example is a joint exercise with 
Australian, US and Chinese forces in the second half of 2014. 
Following East Timorese independence there were strains 
in the relationship between Indonesia and Australia. These 
tensions were eased by the extensive involvement of 
Australian military forces in relief efforts after the tsunami off 
Northern Sumatra in 2004. The soldiers of both countries 
realised that they could work together and patterns of 
dialogue were re-established between senior military officers. 
Another example with Indonesia is the development of a 
broad based alumni association of military officers. At a time 
of strained diplomatic relationships between Australia and 
Indonesia, David Johnston’s warm reception at the Jakarta 
International Defence Dialogue in 2014 would certainly have 
reinforced in his mind the value of military diplomacy.
Diplomats in Uniform - How does it work?
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is the lead agency pursuing Australia’s overseas efforts to 
strengthen its security and enhance its prosperity. They work together with other departments including 
the Department of Defence. This is the formal aspect of military diplomacy as military officers are 
accredited to overseas missions and work at the direction of the Ambassador or High Commissioner. 
They carry diplomatic passports and have the same rights and privileges as other embassy staff. They 
are diplomats in uniform.
Recently the 
Minister for Defence, 
David Johnston, 
declared himself to 
be very strong on 
military diplomacy.
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In this role the Military Attaché and their staff support 
the formal diplomatic mission through direct diplomacy 
such as meetings and negotiations, delivering defence 
cooperation programs, providing advice on capability 
development options, supporting humanitarian and disaster 
relief missions and directly participating in evacuation and 
intervention operations.
Some may be surprised by the involvement of the military in 
diplomatic activities. They may be wondering how ‘rough’ military types can behave in a diplomatic or 
tactful manner. Military officials world-wide share a common culture and professional approach based 
on directness, precision and common experiences. The military clearly understand the dangers of war 
and are keen to take every step to foster peace and security and avoid conflict if at all possible. Even 
adversaries work well together at the task of military diplomacy. As an example, during Konfrontasi with 
Indonesia in the 1960s, military attachés from both countries remained in place.
Essentially the military talk to each other in both a formal and informal manner. This dialogue 
strengthens established relationships with allies and friends to support alliances, aid interoperability and 
build capability by exchanging technology, enhancing training, improving doctrine and sharing lessons 
from military experiences. It is not only military officers who engage in military diplomacy. Defence 
diplomacy happens when defence civilians, rather than military officers, work to enhance relationships. 
An important example of this is when senior civilian officials travel to regional countries to inform them of 
the contents of defence official documents including Defence White Papers.
Dialogue can also occur with the military of countries where formal diplomacy is poorly developed 
or undergoing strain. In these instances military diplomacy can help to maintain dialogue and build 
confidence to avoid confusion, misapprehension and misunderstanding. It also establishes relationships 
and provides the chance for more formal discussions at later occasions.
Military diplomacy doesn’t just happen. But it is not as though it can be planned. It requires a broad 
based investment, takes time to mature and doesn’t work in every case. Often it can develop from 
attendance at schools or courses or participation in United Nations missions years prior. More recent 
activities have involved cooperation on the all too frequent humanitarian and disaster relief missions. 
In this case improved relationships between Japan and Australia can be linked to cooperation on UN 
missions in Cambodia, East Timor, Iraq and Australian military support to natural disasters in Japan. 
A strong example of the long term investment required is the warm relationship between the recently 
retired Australian Chief of Defence Force David Hurley and his Indonesian counterpart General 
Moeldoko, who recently attended General Hurley’s retirement ceremony in Canberra. As a young 
cadet at the Royal Military College David Hurley hosted Indonesian cadets on a visit to Australia. His 
subsequent respect for and interest in Indonesia is well known in Indonesia and has carried forward to 
include his involvement in frequent and substantive contact with senior Indonesian military officials. 
Most of the dialogue is among senior officers but efforts are made to include more junior officers such 
as through exchanging cadets at respective military colleges. This is an important investment in future 
relationships. Another example of lower level engagement 
is the conduct of rifle shooting competitions. The Australian 
Army’s Skill at Arms Competition attracts enthusiastic teams 
from across the globe, including teams from Indonesia.
Not every investment in military diplomacy will pay off. 
Everyone leaves the military at some stage, careers paths 
may change and respective national interests may be 
so divergent that military diplomacy may not work. But 
when it works it works well and can be a force multiplier 
of considerable impact. In my own experience, as a senior 
Army officer, military diplomacy meant that I was able to 
talk to foreign colleagues to speed up the acquisition of 
military capabilities and ammunition for operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. I was also able to use personal contact to 
defuse potential tension over Australian military deployments 
to East Timor in 2006. 
Military diplomacy 
doesn’t just happen.
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Policy recommendation
That the Minister maintain his interest in military diplomacy and direct the 
ADF to seek ways of further enhancing military diplomacy with a focus on the 
Asia Pacific Region.
It is good that the Minister for Defence is strong on military diplomacy. He would do well to make sure 
his department knows of his enthusiasm. In an area where the payoff is not immediately obvious there 
can be a temptation to look for savings. Military diplomacy is not the place to look. If he is looking for 
a place to reinforce his message he should focus on the Staff College and the Centre for Defence and 
Strategic Studies at Weston Creek. They are model programs of military diplomacy and deliver great 
benefit to Australia and the region.
Conclusion
To many the involvement of the military adds a new dimension to diplomacy. To some there are 
suspicions about its efficacy. Well they better get used to it as it is proving to be a very effective way 
of improving trust and confidence among countries and enhancing overall efforts to build peace and 
security. In a globalised world it is clear that the task of diplomacy does not only belong to diplomats. 
Critics should anticipate the continuing use of military diplomacy and might well anticipate an increased 
involvement of other ‘non-diplomatic’ types in diplomatic efforts such as the Australian Federal Police 
and the about to be established Australian Border Force.
Lieutenant General (Ret.) Peter Leahy is the Director of the National Security Institute at the University of 
Canberra. He was Australia’s Chief of Army from 2002 to 2008.
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No matter how 
flawed those bodies 
are, they allow 
Australia to walk 
among giants. 
Digging in its backyard: 
Why Australia should deepen engagement with 
Southeast Asia
See Seng Tan
Executive summary
 > Reasons for why Australia should deepen defence engagement with Southeast 
Asia outweigh those against it. 
 > Southeast Asia is important to Australia as a buffer and hedge against a 
potential China threat and as a region of import to its key ally, the United States. 
 > ASEAN and its suite of regional arrangements allow Australia to engage the 
great powers in high-level security dialogue and defence cooperation beyond 
what it can do on its own.
Questions are being asked today about the feasibility and effectiveness of Australia’s continued defence 
engagement with Southeast Asia. Defence budget cuts and a new Defence White Paper which the 
Coalition will publish in 2015 are encouraging uncertainty. Coming on the heels of the region’s collective 
handwringing over whether US rebalancing to Asia could be sustained due also to defence cuts, the 
Australian debate about DWP2015 has a hint of déjà vu about it. 
No matter the merits of arguments against the continuation of Australia defence diplomacy towards 
Southeast Asia, I suggest they are far outweighed by the reasons why Australia should not only 
continue but deepen its engagement in the region. If anything, Southeast Asia has grown in importance 
for Australia in recent years and that trend will not be reversed any time soon. In economic terms, 
the region to be sure pales in comparison to China, the top trading partner of Australia since 2007.1 
In security terms however, Southeast Asia has arguably risen in prominence in Canberra’s strategic 
outlook and not simply because of Indonesia’s perennial importance to Australia. 
Buffering and Hedging
Five decades ago, Sir Shane Paltridge, the former defence 
minister, argued that Australian strategic thinking on 
Southeast Asia has long been defined by Canberra’s acute 
awareness of the region’s relative weakness, an imbalance 
in economic and security resources, and its uneasiness over 
China’s strategic ambitions vis-à-vis Southeast Asia, both 
of which hold implications for Australia’s security.2 With the 
ending of the Cold War and China serving notice on its rising 
power, an Asia from which Australia had sought previously 
to protect itself had become the region where Australia can 
best guarantee its future prosperity and ‘seek security with…
rather than from it.3
From a security perspective, Southeast Asia has figured 
in that paradigm shift as reflected in Australian Defence 
White Papers of the past three decades. While DWP1987 stressed self-reliance in the direct defence 
of Australia, DWP2000, mindful of the prospect for rising instability in Australia’s near abroad (e.g. East 
Timor in 1999), rationalised and urged the expansion of Australia’s defence diplomacy in the Asia Pacific 
while maintaining its peacekeeping commitments globally.4 Crucially, the ‘concentric circles’ approach 
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of DWP2000 placed Indonesia (together with Timor Leste, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and 
the South Pacific islands) within the second priority circle, but ‘relegated’ Southeast Asia to the third 
or next outer circle. Although the concentric circles approach has more or less been retained within 
DWP2009 and DWP2013, the place of Southeast Asia however has been ‘upgraded’ in Canberra’s 
strategic thinking. If anything, Southeast Asia looms large in DWP2013 and has in fact become central 
to Australia’s defence diplomacy efforts.5 While its sister document, the Australia in the Asian Century 
White Paper, has been criticized for its relative silence on Southeast Asia and ASEAN,6 the same cannot 
be said about DWP2013. Furthermore, DWP2013 highlights 
a key challenge for Australia’s so-called ‘outgoing maritime 
strategy’, for which China’s recent assertiveness in regional 
waters and its formidable Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2AD) 
capability have understandably proved worrisome. ‘Australia 
is thoroughly enmeshed in a global sea-based trading 
system, not least as a major supplier of commodities to 
China’, as maritime expert Geoffrey Till has argued. ‘A threat 
to the system’s operation represents an indirect threat to 
Australia’s interests’.7 
With Southeast Asia standing between it and its largest 
trading partner, Australia cannot afford to ignore Southeast 
Asia. Deepening ties with ASEAN states – and not just with 
Indonesia, as Huxley has cautioned8 – has been critical 
not only to maintaining the region as a buffer against 
untoward Chinese ambitions should they manifest, but 
providing Australia an economic alternative or hedge. As one 
commentator has acerbically put it, Australia’s ‘newly found 
love of regional engagement is all about winning over the half 
billion souls that live between [it] and China over to [its] way 
of thinking’.9
Walking Among Giants
Australia played key roles in the formation of region-wide arrangements such as the APEC and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Recent policies have indicated strong continued support for the 
ARF and the East Asia Summit (EAS) and Canberra’s intention to ‘take a leading role’ in the ASEAN 
Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+).10 Despite its awkward ‘multi-multilateral’ character, ASEAN’s 
suite of regional arrangements furnish ample regular opportunities for Australia to engage the great 
powers in high-level security dialogue and defence cooperation beyond what it can do on its own. ‘In 
no multilateral fora would our Prime Minister sit with the leaders of the United States, Japan, China, 
Indonesia or any of the states of South East Asia. The leadership of those countries occupied a world 
beyond us’, as Paul Keating once conceded in the context of Australian participation in Asia’s evolving 
regional architecture.11 If anything, involvement in the ARF, EAS and ADMM+, no matter how flawed 
those bodies are, allows Australia to ‘walk amongst giants’.12 
In this regard, Australia’s partnership with ASEAN and 
other stakeholder countries becomes even more crucial 
as they work to render those institutions into ‘effective 
mechanisms to manage regional and transnational security 
issues and risks arising from rivalries and the possibilities of 
miscalculation’.13 
Region’s Importance to America
Finally, Southeast Asia and ASEAN are critical to Australia 
because the region and the organisation have grown in 
significance for the United States, Australia’s key ally. As US 
support for Japan’s military normalisation has underscored, 
enhanced burden-sharing among allies has become an 
expectation from which no one, not least Australia, is 
exempt.14 In a recent study on Australian defence diplomacy 
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Policy recommendation
Australia should actively seek to deepen security ties and defence cooperation 
with Southeast Asian countries both bilaterally and multilaterally. To that 
end, the anticipated 2015 Defence White Paper should build on the relevant 
recommendations called for by its predecessors.
prepared by a team of respected analysts, what stood 
out among a host of policy recommendations on how the 
Australian Defence Forces (ADF) could enhance its military-
to-military engagement with Southeast Asian countries were 
proposals to enhance ADF contributions in areas where 
US forces might draw down in the future. For example, 
counterinsurgency assistance to the Philippines.15 While 
such readiness to plug gaps left by the Americans could 
encourage allegations that Canberra is again playing as 
Washington’s deputy sheriff or poodle in the Asia Pacific,16 
it is clearly in Australia’s interest to assist the region and 
deepen its ties with it. 
Arguing that Australia needs Asia more than the other way round, Ramesh Thakur believes that 
regional engagement is Australia’s ‘path to salvation from economic marginalization, political loneliness 
and, ultimately, strategic irrelevance’.17 Much as Australia should deepen its defence engagement 
with Southeast Asia and ASEAN for its own purposes, there is no doubt the region also needs 
Australia’s partnership. 
See Seng Tan is Associate Professor, Deputy Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at 
the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
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